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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETH M. WARDELL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs.-
HARVEY R. JERMAN and 
DAVID A. JERMAN, a minor, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case 
No.10554 
AP·PELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out 
of an automobile collision which occurred at the inter-
section of 7th East Street and Springview Drive in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury which returned a gen-
eral verdict in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff, no cause of action. Judgment on the verdict 
was entered, and plaintiff made a motion for a new trial, 
which was thereafter denied. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the juclgmer ' 
in the court below and a new trial. t 
(_ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
t 
Exhibit P-9 is a scale map of the intersection ir 
~ 
volved in this action of Springview Drive and 7th Eaf 
( 
Street, which discloses a large intersectin, arising fror f 
the fact that Springview Drive intersecting from th 
I 
east clog legs to the south as it proceeds westerly frm 1 
the intersection. Although Springview Drive is onl 
28.7 feet wide on the east end of the intersection, 7f t 
East is 129 feet wide north and south between the tip r 
of the opposing raised islands. 
The plaintiff, Beth J'vL Wardell, was the wife of th 
dri\'er, Harold 0. \Vardell. She had driven the car fror 
I 
her home to the Western Union office in Salt Lake Cit: t 
with her husband, for the purpose of sending her olde1 ~ 
<-
son, who was in the Marines, money for a birthday pref c 
ent. (R. 119) The plaintiff invited her husband to g, t 
with her to send the money, and the husband decided th2 , 
he would go as she was taking the little boy with he1 1 
(R. 158) \Vardell testified that his wife was already 1 ~ 
the car vvhen he went out to get in it, and that she dro1 ~ 
to ""Western Union. When they left \Vestern Union, L 
was the driver. There \Vas no discussion whatsoever a 
[ 
to who should drive the car home, and from that poir 
to the point of collision there was no discssion whatsoeYr 
t 
between the plaintiff and her husband with respect t 
t 
his driYing or the mannrr of it. (R. 159) 
2 
The cnr \Yas registere<l i11 the plaintiff's name, but 
, wliatec,·er sums had beeu pai<l toward the purchase of 
thf' car had been hy the husband. The wife paid no part 
of the' purchase priC'c. (R. 159, 160, 161) There was no 
discussion hetwe0n the hm;lnmd and wife as to whether 
1 he car should belong to her or to her husband. It was 
supposed to be a family car. (R. 162) In explaining the 
ownership of the automobile•, the husband testified as 
[ 
follows: "I have a truck and she has a car. Now, I use 
1 my car for my work and when shr goes shopping she uses 
~ her car. The word 'vour truck-mv truck' I use that I . . 
statement myself. I mean the word 'mine' doesn't mean 
that she is total owner of thr car. It's a family car." 
1 The husband considered himself a part owner of it. 
(R. 170) 
The wife testified that she did not make any com-
1 m0nt of any kind as to the operation of the vehicle from 
t. the time her husband took over until the time of the 
acf·ident. (R. 197) She stated that her husband always 
did the driving and this occasion (her driving from home 
to town) was the only time that she had ever driven 
a wh0n he wns along. She stated that she preferred to 
'
1 ride with a man, not drive, and she drove on this occasion 
simply heeanse she was already in the car before he 
1 g-ot in. (R. 200) 
The plaintiff stated that she first saw the defend-
ants' car wheu it was ,·ery clos0 -- between 15 or 20 feet, 
:rn•l that the vVartlell car had not at any time entered 
t110 10f1 tnrn 1mw, hnt maintained its position in the 
tltrnng]1 lane prior to impad. (R. 120) 
:~ 
She was seriously injured and will require futur1 
surgery. (R. 121, 127) (Details of injury are not se l 
forth, as their consideration is not required for purpose1 ' 
of the appeal.) 
The plaintiff's husband (hereafter usually referreD 
to as Wardell) activated his left turn signal at the poin1 
indicated by a green 3 on Exhibit P-9, and at tha1 
time he was in the southbound lane of travel adjacent fa. 
the left turn lane. (R. 164) Wardell was intending tu 
enter the left turn lane which commenced 64 feet south ol 
the Springview Drive intersection. (Exhibit P-9, R. 154) ' 
Wardell testified that he did not think he would mislead ' 
the other driver into thinking he was going to turn up 
Springvirw Drive because of the speed he was traveling < 
(R. 177, and because it ·was a long intersection. (R. 180) 
"\Vardell was traveling 35 miles per hour as he en- 1 
tered the intersection. (R. 182) Wardell identified hy 1 
the green numeral 5 his position in the intersection at 
the time he saw the defendants' truck at the point marked 1 
by a green 4. The next time Wardell saw the defendants' 
vehicle, he was about 40 feet away, directly in front of 
him, and Wardell had very little opportunity to apply 
his brakes. (R. 165) He did not see the clef endants' truck 
after it had arrived near the encl of the island for the 
left turn until the def enclants' truck was in front of him. 
He did not keep his eyes constantly on defendants' truck, 
as he "Tas watching for his left turn lane up 33rd South 
and other traffic. ( R. 182) 
4 
u1 rrhe dcfeudant David Arnold Jerman testified that 
se he was 151/2 years old at the time of the accident (R. 
se1 201); that as he approached the intersection of 7th East 
a!ld Springview Drive, intending to turn west on Spring-
view Drive, he was in the left turn lane and traveling 
'eD a hout 25 miles per hour at the point where the left 
in1 turn lane starts. (R. 203) He reduced his speed to about 
tal l 5 miles per hour in the left turn lane and reduced his 
fa. gears from third to second. ( R. 204) 
tu 
ol At the time David Jerman first saw the Wardell 
4) \'ehicle, it was about four or five car lengths away. (R. 
ad 209) At that time the Wardell vehicle was in the south-
11p bound through lane and the def end ant David Jerman 
ng did not at any time observe Wardell in the actual act 
) of turning from the through southbound lane. The only 
tim0 he ever saw the Wardell vehicle, it appeared to be 
11- continuing straight ahead. (R. 210) When he observed 
hy the vVardell vehicle he saw the left turn blinker sig-
at naling. (R. 205) After observing the Wardell car, he 
?d continued to go through the left turn lane and make his 
s turn. He did not see the Wardell car again before im-
of pact. When he first saw the Wardell car, he saw no 
ly other vehicles by it, but noticed a few cars behind it to 
3k the north. (R. 206) 
lC 
n. He was pretty familiar with the highway at the point, 
k, J1a ving traveled it quite a bit. (R. 208) He was familiar 
:h with the offset intersection. (R. 209) He saw the War-
d .. 11 car just long enough to observe the signal, and then 
li0 1vithdrew his Yision from the car and did not there-
5 
after look in that direction to see where the Ward1 
car was. He specifically testified as follows: 
Q. ''So that you never at any time after this ii 
tial momentary glance at him returned yoi 
vision in his direction 7'' 
A. "Yes, sir." 
Q. ''Is that correct 7'' 
A. ''Yes.'' (R. 211) 
He did not see the Wardell car at any time befo 
rE 
impact, and did not see any other southbound car aft1 
the momentary glance at any time before impat 
(R. 212) 7t 
le 
The Deputy Sheriff who investigated the accident eg1 
tablished the impact at the point marked with a r~11 
cross on Exhibit P-9 and stated that the Wardell vfr 
hicle was still at the point of impact when he arrivehi 
at the scene, and the defendants' vehicle was at tlfa 
point marked by an encircled D on Exhibit P-9. He saitl 
there were just three feet of skid marks made Ly \Vat" 
dell's right front tire, and no other skid mark wiw 
visible. There ·was extensive damage to the front end ~g~ 
the Wardell vehicle, and defendants' truck was damaged1 
on the right side - the right door and the right fendeil 
(R. 151, Exhibits P-10 and P-13) The left turn lartl 
for traffic intending to turn east on 33rd South extenclei l 
rontinuously from a point 64 feet south of the intersea1 
tion involved in this action to 33rcl South (R. 155) lt 
hi 
trd1 
s ii 
yoi 
ARGU~fENT 
POINT 1 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW IN MAKING A LEFT 
rrURN DIRECTLY IN'rO THE PATH OF THE 
ONCOMING WARDELL CAR, AND THIS 
NEGLIGENCE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The following undisputed facts appear rn the 
eforecord: 
aft1 
,pat The driver of the Wardell car was southbound on 
7th East in the southbound lane of travel adjacent to th.e 
left turn lane. When he arrived at point 3 (marked in 
it egreen) on Exhibit P-9, he activated his left turn signal 
' r~ntending to make a left turn after he passed through 
1 v1the intersection into the left turn lane for traffic proceed-
riveing from 7th East easterly on 33rd South. This left turn 
; tllftne commenced just 64 feet south of the north tip of 
saitlw raised island on the south side of the intersection. 
WaiW a rd ell first saw the defendants' truck when Ward ell 
wiwas within the intersection at the point marked with a 
1d ~grren 5 on Exhibit P-9. At that time he obserYed the 
agedcfe11dants 'trnck at the point marked by a green 4 in 
ndeih left turn lane facing him. The \Vardell vehicle, at 
Iarthis point, \Vas beyond the Sprin,Q,"vie\Y Drive dog leg on 
ndetlH' east. Wardell asirnmed that the defendant would 
rse.all<nY him to pass through hrfore atempting the left 
') forn. \Varde11 bad never at any time left the south-
hPnml through lane of traffic. He was approximately 40 
7 
feet from the defendants' truck when it turned left in 11 
path. He had very little opportunity to apply his brake 
It is significant that only the right front side ( 
defendants' truck, including the right door and rig! 
front fender, were damaged in the collision. 
The defendant Jerman stated that he had reduce 
his speed to about 15 miles per hour in the left hand tur 
lane on the south end of th intersection. The first a11 
only time that he saw the Wardell vehicle it was in tL 
southbound through lane next to the left-hand turn Ian 
about four or five car lengths away, which would ma~ 
his testimony almost agree with that of Wardell at pl 
1 
sition marked with a green 5. When Wardell was at thi 
point he was traveling at about 35 miles per hour an 
he had already passed any opportunity to turn east at th 
intersection on Sringview Drive. 
At the time the defendant attempted his left tur 
in front of the oncoming Wardell car, Wardell was le~ 
than two seconds away, and it is not surprising that tb 
defendant was only able to get the front end of his trm I 
I 
into the path of the vV ardell car before the collision Oi ~ 
curred. There ran be no question that the defendar ( 
Jerman had a duty to continue observing the Warde E 
vehicle, despite the left turn signal, because the Warde 1 
vehicle could not possibly have turned left in the inte1 i 
section at the first and only time that the defendant sa' J 
it, and at that time the Wardell vehicle was proceedin < 
straight ahead on an undeviating course at the speed t < 
35 miles per hour. 
1 
8 
e ( 
rig! 
uce 
tur 
all 
itL 
Ian 
na~ 
Section 41-6-69 U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows: 
" (a) No person shall turn a vehicle at an inter-
section unless the vehicle is in proper position 
upon the roadway as required in Section 41-6-66, 
or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or drive-
way or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct 
course or move right or left upon a roadway un-
less and until such movement can be made with 
reasonable safety. No person shall turn any ve-
hicle without giving an appropriate signal in the 
manner hereinafter provided in the event any 
other traffic may be affected by such movement.'' 
Section 41-6-73 U.C.A. 1953 as amended by laws of 
t 
Utah 1961, Chapter 86, Section 1, provides as follows: 
pl 
; thi 
an 
t th 
tur 
le~ 
"The driver of a vehicle within an intersection 
intending to turn to the left shall yield the right 
of way to any vehicle approaching from the oppo-
site direction which is within the intersection or 
so close thereto as to constitute an immediate haz-
n rd, during the time when such driver is moving 
within the intersection.'' 
t tb It can hardly be argued .that the defendants' com-
;rm plied with the duties imposed upon them by Section 
n Oi 41-G-<19, and movement to the left under the circumstances 
Ldar of this ease could not have been made with reasonable 
rde safety; indeed, the oncoming vehicle was traveling 35 
.rde mi1cs per hour in the through lane, within the intersec-
t tion, approximately 40 feet away, when the defendant n~ . 
DaYid Jerman placed his truck directly in its path with-
, sa' • 
d
. out ymying heed to its presence, rendering the collision 
> 1]1 • .. 
, d eomrlletolY urnn'oirlable hv the oncoming vehicle; and 
Cl ( • • 
~ he most c0rtai11ly violated the (luty imposed upon him by 
9 
Section 41-6-73 in that he failed to yield the right of wa; 
to the oncoming vehicle which was within the interse« 
tion, so close to him as to constitute an immediate hazara 
The principle contended for here was thorough]. 
discused and explicitly ruled upon by this Court in thi 
case of Cederloff v. vVhited, 110 U. 45, 169, Pac. 2d 771 
In that case the plaintiff was proceeding north on Stat1 
Street, having passed through the intersection of 9tl 
South. At a point about 200 feet north of the intersee 
ti on, the defendant turned left directly into the path o: 
the plaintiff's vehicle, and a collision ensued. The poin: 
of impact was a few feet east of the center line of thr 
street, and about in the middle of the traffic lane i1 
which plaintiff's car was traceling. As in the case ol 
bar, the front part of defendant's car was all that hari 
gotten into the path of the plaintiff's vehicle art the tiIIll 
of impact. In that case, as in the case of bar, the drive1 
of palintiff's car applied brakes but was unable to stop 
In that case, as in the case of bar, the defendant's ca1 
moved only a very short distance after it commence( 
the left turn before it would be directly in the course oi 
travel of plaintiff's vehicle. In writing the decision ol 
the Court, Mr. Justice 'Vade made the following saliell1 
observations which we feel are applicable here: 
"Section 57-7-133 U.0.A. 1943 pro-\·ides: '(a) N1 
person shall turn a vehicle from a direct cour~1 
upon a highway unless and until such movement 
can he made with reasonahle safet!T· ... ' 
"Defendant turned his car from a direct cours0 i1 
the highway into the lane of traffic intended fo 
vehicles trnv(>.ling in tl1c opposite c1irectio11 nt ; 
10 
thi 
i7I 
:at1 
9tl 
. o: 
>m 
thr 
II 
01 
1ari 
lili 
ve1 
op 
~a1 
ol 
time when plaintiff's car was approaching in such 
closP proximity that the collision occurred as soon 
as the front end of defendant's car had reached a 
few fe0t into plaintiff's lane of traffic .... 
"Thus as a matter of law, defendant's negligence 
would he the sole, proximate cause of the accident. 
And, eYen though the plaintiff's driver failed to 
keep a proper lookout and for that reason did not 
Ree the defendant slowly making the turn, such 
failure would not lw a proximate contributing 
cause of the collision, because he could not, under 
those circumstances, be reasonably expected to 
have done any different than he did had he kept a 
proper lookout, so under that srf:ate of facts, the 
Court should have instructed as a matter of law 
that the defendant's negligence was the sole, prox-
imate canse of the- accident.'' 
In his concurring comment Mr. Justice Wolfe said: 
"I concur. The driver making the left hand turn 
in most every case has control of the situation. He 
knows ·when he is going to turn. The opposing 
approaching drivers must discover it. Even where 
an approaching driver is coming too rapidly, the 
left hand turn drivers must take that into consid-
eration. All the more reason why he should not 
take a chance. After all, the approaching driver is 
in his own lane.'' 
e111 This case was cited with approval in Hart v. Kerr, 
175 Pac. 2d 475, 110 U. 479, where the plaintiff was held 
negligent as a matter of law in turning left in front of 
N1 
r~i a vehich~ approaching from the opposite direction. 
In 60 C.J.S. 367, page !HO appc>ars the following: 
"\Vhen• two veliieles are approaching in opposite 
directions and the driver of one intends to make 
a ldt turn inlo mi inten.;ecting street, it is his duty 
11 
so to watch and time the movement of the othe ~ 
car as reasonaLly to insure himself of a safe pas 1 
sage either in front or back of such car; and h 
must even stop and wait for the passage of th 1 
other car if this is reasonably necessary to avoi1 
danger .... 
"It is the driver's duty not to make a left tur1 
into or across the path of another vehicle whicl 
is approaching in the opposite direction and is s1 
near at hand that such turn makes a collision prob 
able, and this duty exists irrespective of any ques 
tion of right of way .... '' 
The only time the defendant David Jerman ever oh 
served the Wardell automobile was when it was near oi 
in the intersection, four or five car lengths away, trar 
eling at a speed of 35 miles per hour in the southbouni 
traffic lane. Had he continued to regard the W ardel 
vehicle, as it was his duty to do, it would have been easil; 
apparent to him that it would be extremely dangerom 
to thrust his vehicle into the path of the oncoming car 
and the fact that he was only able to get the front end o! 
his truck into the path of the Wardell automobile whe1 
the impact occurred, illustrates his extreme folly in at 
tempting the left turn at that particular moment. Ht 
had control of the situation, and knew that he was goiw 
to make the left turn, whereas the oncoming driver wonl1! 
not know it until it was too late to avoid collision. 
He excuses himself by the statement that the 011' 
coming car was exhibiting a left turn signal at the 
one and only moment ·when he saw it, and he assume1! 
that it was going to make an impossibie turn at tlir 
12 
te speed of 35 miles per hour to go east on Springview 
~ Drive. Under the statute, the Wardell ~ehicle could not 
h have lawfully made such a turn 'vithout first placing itself 
1i1 i11 the left turn lane prior to entering the intersection. 
OJ 
.li 
J! 
Section 41-6-66 U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows: 
"(b) At the intersection where traffic is permit-
ted to move in both directions on each roadway 
entering the intersection, an approach for a left 
turn shall be made in that portion of the right 
half of the roadway nearest the center line there-
of and by passing to the right of such center line 
where it enters the intersection and after enter-
ing the intersection the left turn shall be made so 
as to leave the intersection to the right of the cen-
ter line of the roadway being entered. Whenever 
practicable the left turn shall be made in that por-
tion of the intersection to the left of the center 
of the intersection.'' 
" ( d) Local authorities in their respective juris-
dictions may cause markers, buttons or signs to be 
placed within or adjacent to intersections and 
thereby require and direct that a different course 
from that Hpecified in this section be traveled by 
vehicles turning at an intersection, and when 
markers, buttons or signs are so placed no driver 
of a vehicle shall turn a vehicle at an intersection 
other than as directed and required by such mark-
er, buttons or sign." 
rl1he defendant David Jerman had no right to assume 
tliat the \Varc1f~ll :rntomohile would violate the statute 
l-
ie ;jn:-;t qnoted and wonkl attempt a left turn without first 
!!Pit i1ig into the left turn lane, and as long as that vehicle 
11 
n·rni1 irw<1 in the through lane, it was his duty to continue 
13 
to regard it to determine whether it would be safe for hirn 
to turn left across that lane. The defendant David Jer. 
man was familiar with this intersection, and that ve. 
hides intending to turn into the left turn lane to pro 
ceed east on 33rd South would be required to give a sig. 
nal within the intersection involved in this case, in order 
to give adequate notice to other traffic of its intenti011 
to enter the left turn lane which commenced just 69 feel 
beyond the intersection in which this collision occurred. 
There was no greait necessity or emergency or cause 
beyond his control which required the defendant David 
Jerman to attempt to snatch the right of way from the 
oncoming vehicle at the risk of grea.t danger to himsell 
and the occupants of the oncoming car, although thP 
Court in its Instruction No. 20 encouraged such a finding. 
(R. 35) vVe think it crystal clear that the defendant, i11 
making his left turn under the circumstances confront· 
ing him at that time, was greatly negligent as a matter o[ 
law, and the jury should have been so instructed. 
When the defendant David Jerman negligently 
turned left into the path of the plaintiff's car, under tlH 
circumstances of this case, plaintiff had no opportunit) 
·whatever to avoid the collision, and, therefore, the iwgli· 
gence of the defendants was the sole proximate cause of 
the collision. 
POINT 2 
THERE \VAS NO EVIDENCE UPON vVHICH 
THE .JURY COULD BASE A FINDING OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THF 
PART OF PLAINTIFF OR THE DRIVER OF 
rrHE WARDELL CAR. 
] 4. 
H 
F 
F 
F 
There was no contcntio11 made at the trial that 
ihe plaintiff herself was guilty of any negligent act or 
omission, except as it might be imputed to her, and there 
was no evidence of any breach of duty on her part which 
was a contributing cause of the accident. 
It "vas contended by counsel for the defendants at 
the trial that Wardell was negligent in activating his left 
tnrn signal as he approached or entered the intersection. 
That the defendant, David Jerman, could not have been 
reasonably misled into believing that Wardell intended 
to turn east on Springview Drive, is apparent from the 
fact that the only time that defendant saw the Wardell 
ear exhibiting this signal, Wardell was only four or five 
car lengths away, and beyond any point where he could 
have negotiated a left turn into Springview Drive, and, 
the ref ore, the left turn being signaled was for the pur-
pose of showing an intention on the part of Ward ell to 
make a left tnrn beyond the intersection into the left 
turn lane for traffic expecting to turn east on 33rd South. 
'N 1trdell was, therefore, justified in believing that his left 
t11rn signal would not mislead tlw defendant, David Jer-
mmi. Moreover, he ·was traveling 35 miles per hour at 
that time and was proceeding on an undeviating south-
honnd course in the southbound through lane of traffic. 
It must also be remembered, in connection with this 
i ){)int, that there was other vehicular traffic following 
'Vardell, to whom he owed a dnt~, of exhibiting his left 
tnrn signal at least 100 feet before he left his lane of 
trnfllc to proceed into the left turn lane which started im-
mecli at0 }y heyonrl. tliP intersection in question. Indeed, 
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the def end ant David Jerman saw other vehicles behind 
the Wardell car. (R. 206) 
It is inconceivable that Wardell could be charged 
with negligence in discharging a duty imposed upon him 
by staute. rrhe Court in its Instruction No. 24 limited 
the application of the 100 foot turn signal requiremenl 
to the intersection and as hereafter pointed out, refused 
to give plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 8 to the ef. 
feet that the law imposed upon Wardell the duty of giving 
a signal at least 100 feet before changing lanes. That the 
Court was guilty of judicial legislation in so restricting 
the application of this statute is indicated by the provi. 
sion of the S'tatute itself. 
Section 41-6-69 U.C.A. 1953 provides: 
'; (a) No person shall turn a vehicle at an inter-
section unless the vehicle is in proper position 
upon the roadway as required in Section 41-6-66, 
or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or drive· 
way, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direcl 
course or move right or left upon a roadway un· 
less and until such movement can be made with 
reasonable safety. No person shall turn any 
vehicle without giving an appropriate signal i11 
the manner hereinafter provided in the event any 
other vehicle may be affected by such movement. 
'' (b) A signal of intention to turn right or left 
shall be given continuously during not less tha11 
the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before 
turning.'' 
Furthermore, as we have heretofore stated, the de· 
fendant David Jerman should have realized that plain· 
tiff was not going to make the turn to go east on Spring· 
view Drive, because Wardell was not in the designated 
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left turn lane for that purpose, and was making no 
movement in that direction. 
It was claimed by the defendants that Wardell 
was negligent inf ailing to maintain a proper lookout, and 
the Court, in its Instruction No. 17, submitted this issue 
to the jury, although, again, there was no evidence to 
support it. At the time Wardell saw the defendant David 
Jerman, the defendant was in the left turn lane and had 
decreased his speed and reduced his gears, showing every 
apparent intention of allowing Wardell to pursue his 
southbound course. There was no failure on \Vardell's 
part to maintain a proper lookout, and none can be 
found in the record. 
POINT 3 
FJVEN IF WARDELL WAS NEGLIGENT, 
HIS NEGLIGENCF: WAS NOT IMPUTABLE 
rro THE PLAINTIFF. 
Although the vehicle was registered in the plaintiff-
wif e's name, it appears from the evidence that this was 
done for eonvenim1ce, and that all of the payments made 
on the car were made by the husband-driver, and that 
both parties regarded the car as a family car. Indeed, 
com18el for defendants conceded that the car was jointly 
owned by the plaintiff and her husband. (R. 216, 217) 
rrhe plaintiff drove the car to Western Union, as she hap-
pened to be seated in the car before the husband decided 
tu go aloug with her. At the point of desti11atoin when 
;;;;lie Jeft iJw ear to \Vire the monrv to their son, the hus-
haml nssnmrd the <lrivPI' 's seat ~without comment by him 
(>J' tlw lJlaiHtiff, arnl lte llron• the car without any com-
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ment from the plaintiff or any attempt on her part to 
interfere or exercise any control. The plaintiff testi. 
fied that her husband always did the driving, and that the 
occasion of her driving to the Western Union office was 
the only time that she had ever driven when he was 
along, and that she drove on this occasion because she 
was already in the car before he got in. Under these 
facts, the Court erred in instructing the jury that they 
could impute the negligence, if any, of the husband-driver 
to her. One of the leading cases pertinent to this poin! 
is Roach v. Parker (Del.), 107 A. 2d 798. In that case 
the husband was driving and they were taking this wife's 
sister hack to her home. The wife owned the car and was 
present in the car. The Court said: 
"It is fully in accord with common experience to 
presume that an owner-passenger retains the 
right of control when he asks or permits a friend 
or even a child to drive. But to say that this ii 
true of a wife whose husband takes the wheel is to 
ignore realities. See Klein v. Klein, 311 Pa. 217, 
166 A 790 and Watkins v. Overland Motor Freight 
Co., 325 Pa. 312 188 A 848. '' 
''I accept the following statement from Rodgen 
v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479 158 A 169 as the principle 
to be applied here: 'To hold that the facts as 
shown here constituted agency would be carrying 
the principle of implied agency too far. If one ii 
riding in a vehicle with another who is his agen! 
or employee, he is responsible for his acts; bu! 
to hold that when a husband drives the car of hi~ 
wife, she being in it, that he is her agent withoul 
proof of how or under what circumstances he i~ 
driving it, is to go much farther than the law ha~ 
done or we are '~rilling to do ... ' 
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"'The fac.t that Mrs. Rodgers and her husband 
had, in motoring at the time of the accident a com-
mon purpose to reach Gettysburg and later to en-
joy a vacation together at Atlantic City supports 
no inference that she had control of the car.' 
"Defendant's brief contains some allusions to the 
doctrine of joint enterprise. Independent discus-
sion of that subject is not required here, because, 
in order to impute negligence, even under that 
doctrine, there still must be some right of control 
and management of the car. 4 Blashfield Section 
2794, 5-6 Huddy 287. 
'' Since I find no sufficient evidence in the case to 
justify a finding of control in the wife, neither 
the law of agency nor the doctrine of joint enter-
prise can be applied." 
See also Rodgers v. Saxton (Pa.) 158 A. 166. 
In that case the contributory negligence of a hus-
hand driving an automobile owned by the wife in which 
she was present was held not to be imputable to her. The 
Court said: 
"The rel a ti on of pr!nci pal and agent or that of 
master and servant does not necessarily arise 
from the fact that the ·wife owns the car which her 
Jrnsband is driving and in which she is a passen-
ger It is not unsual for a husband to buy a car 
for his wife or his child. He may do so merely 
to give them the pleasure of seeing their initials 
paiuted 011 the door. The husband and father 
1d10 makPs such a gift does not thereby abdicate 
J1is l0gal or factual heaclship of the family, nor is 
IH' t>xclm1<'<1 from the control of that car when 
h<' is . ;;itting in tlit> <lriYN 's sent of authority, eYen 
1110110·'1 1hL' \\·ifc or eliild 1\'110 mav he the nominal 111\rn~· i.c; <11 J1is ;.:i<lP. :\or is th~ husharn1 driYer 
1 ~) 
necessarily the agent or servant of his wife-pas. 
senger, even in those cases where the wife her. 
self has purchased the car with her own funds anJ 
has registered her ownership. The husband j1 
still the head of the family and when he is at th1 
wheel of that car, even with his wife present, the 
presumption is that he is in control of the car, and 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, he ii 
fully responsible for its operation.'' 
See also Virginia P. R. & Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 91 
S.E. 632. 
In the case of Porter v. Wilson (Wyo.) 1960, 357 P. 
2d 309, this same principle was applied. In that case the 
plaintiff-,vifo was the owner and passenger in a car being 
driven by her husband. The car was in her name, appar. 
ently a gift from him. Both of them drove the car <rn 
occasion, but neither of the two could recall whether she 
had requested him to drive at the time of the accident. 
They were on their way to vote in a school election. Tfa 
case discusses at length various decisions on the point in 
question, and ruling that the negligence of the husbarnl 
was not imputable to the owner-wife present in the car. 
the Court said : P. 315 : 
''It seems to us that the cases in which the negli 
gence of the driver has been held to be imputablt 
to the spouse-owner-passenger are much mor1 
summary in nature than those in which the negll 
gence has not been held to be imputed. In othe1 
words, the imputation has been dependent upon r 
formula, which, because of its adoption by a num 
ber of courts, is being perpetuated without in 
quiry. It is significant that opinions on this suh 
ject have seldom stated with any clarity whethe1 
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or not tlrn presumption of control of owner-spouse-
passenger oYer the driver is one of law or fact. If 
the presumption in this situation is one of fact, 
we immediately recall the words of Greenleaf, 
'Evide11ce' 1852, Page 55, quoted with favor in 9 
"\Vigmore Evidence, 3rd Edition, Page 288: Pre-
sumptions of fact, 'are in truth but mere argu-
ments .... They depend upon their own natural 
force and efficacy in generating belief or convic-
tion in the mind .... ' 
''The lack of unanimity among the courts and the 
numerous bases for holding that driver's negli-
gence is imuputable to the spouse-owner-passen-
ger in themselves tend to generate uncertainty 
rather than the 'belief or conviction in the mind' 
mentioned by Greenleaf. On the other hand, those 
courts which have been reluctant to impute a driv-
er's negligence to the spouse-owner-passenger 
have inquired quite carefully into the realities of 
motor vehicle experience and have sought to have 
a rational basis for their holdings. They have 
presented reasoning which seems to have gone un-
answered either Ly court or cciunsel and we are in-
clined to thinl{ there is merit in their views. This 
Court has frequently said that, where facts ap-
pear, presumptions recede and that there is no 
neecssity to resort to presumptions where there is 
direct and positive eYidence upon a matter in issue 
... Accordingly, if there \Vas any evidence on the 
:;mbject of control of the motor vehicle, it, rather 
tl1m1 any presumption will determine the negli-
gem·c of tbc plaiutiff." 
We think that it is in defiiance of human experience 
to ~<:>riously eontrnd that a husband in the driver's seat 
of au autornol1il0 would consider himself to he subject 
tn 1 lil· right of cnntrol of his ·wife in manner and method 
of driving, even her car, and although much has bee, 
said about ''back seat driving'' by the wife, it cannot s~ 
riously be contended that she has the right to contro 
the family car or her car when her husband is at th 
wheel, and to hold that she does flies in the face of fact 
and of reality. 
So it was observed in 5 A. J. 694, Section 354: 
''The mere presence of an owner in an automobili 
while it is being driven in a negligent manner b: 
another does not necessarily make him liable fo 
an injury caused thereby if he would not other 
wise have been liable. Assuming that the owne: 
does not interfere in any way with the manage 
ment of the car, this rule holds whether the ca: 
is being driven by a member of his family or b1 
a stranger to whom he has loaned or hired the car 
A husband driving his wife's automobile, ever 
with the wife present, may be presumed, in thi 
absence of evidence to the contrary, to be in co11 
trol of the car and solely responsible for it 
operation.'' 
We also direct the Court's attention to the case 01 
Painter v. Lingdon, 193 Va. 840, 71 S.E. 2d 355. In thi 
case, after discussing the rule followed by the com' 
that the negligence of the driver-husband could not hi 
imputed to the wife present in the car without othe1 
proof of agency, the court said: 
"The husband testified that the husband bough 
and paid for the automobile for the use of his faro 
ily. While he had the title registered in his wife' 
name, he used the car at will and especially i1 
going to and from his place of business. Plair1 
tiff used it just as she had used other antomohile 
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formerly purchased hy the husband and regis-
tered in his name. The entire expense of opera-
tion and maintenance was paid by the husband, 
regardless of whether the automobile was used 
by him or his wife. 
"It is not unusual for a husband to buy a car for 
the use of his wife, title to which is sometimes reg-
j sitererl iu the husband's name and sometimes in 
the wife's name. When a husband is driving an 
automobile so acquired and registered, the pre-
sumption is that h0 is in absolute control, even 
though the wife is in the car with him, and in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, he is solely 
responsible for its operation. Rodgers v. Saxton, 
305 Pa. 479, 158 A. 166 A.L.R. 280, 283. 
"The fact that title to an automobile is regis-
tered in the name of the wife is not conclusive that 
she is the actual owner and clothed with all the 
rights, benefits and liabilities flowing therefrom. 
U.S. Gas Co. v. Bain, 191 Va. 717, 62 S. E. 2d 814. 
'' 'Vhile plaintiff frequently used the automobile 
on short trips in nnd around Portsmouth, she sel-
clom d1·oye it when her husband was present. On 
the eYening in question she drove the automobile 
to her hushand's barber shop where he took pos-
session arnl control and retained control until the 
time of the collision. 
"lTnder the foregoing circumstances, registration 
of the title to the automobile in the name of the 
plnintiff did not give her the right as a matter of 
law to exercise control oYcr the operation of it 
when her husband was dri\'ing, nor is there any 
('\ i<1eneP h•nding to show t1rnt shr attempted to 
C''\'Cr<'ise i1ff\' frneh control or make an~' suggestions 
<l hnut tlir r.nntP or thP mmmrr in ,\'l1ieh the au to-
mo hi l (' 1s n s he ii 1 .": n p ('rat ( · < 1 u 11 this trip. . . . " 
The Court then cites with approval the decision (I 
Rodgers v. Saxton, supra, and further stated at page 360 
''As heretofore stated, plaintiff surrendered poi 
session and control of the automobile to her hus 
hand at 7 :00 p.m. and he continued in absolut1 
control until the time of the accident. Painter wa. 
just as much a bailee in this case as Gornuch wa 
in Virginia R. & P. Co. v. Gorsuch, supra .... 
"Since we hold that the husband's negligence, i 
any, is not imputable to plaintiff, it is not nece~ 
sary to pass upon the question of his negligence' 
The Virginia case just cited very closely parallel 
the case at bar in all of its salient facts and its conclu 
sions appeal to reason ancl satisfy the mind. They ar, 
not based upon flimsy, unrealistic myths or doctrines tha 
do violence to the realities of life. 
A fortiori the negligence of the husband-driver i· 1 
this case should not have been imputed to the plaintift 
if, as counsel for the defendants concedes (R. 216, 2171 
the husband and wife were joint owners of the automi 
bile he was driving. We desire to call the Court's atte11 
tion to Restatement of Torts, 2d, Secition 495, from whici 
we quote as follows: 
"(d) In order to bar the plaintiff from recowr 
under the rule stated in this section, it is necessar 
that the plaiHtiff know or should know that it: 
essential for his safety to control the conduct o 
the third person. A plaintiff may know whn 
the third person is doing but may have n 
reason to realize that it is. necessary for him t 
intervene.'' 
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W c do uot perceive under the evidence in this case 
where any conduct on the part of the driver-husband 
\rnnJd require or even remotely suggest the need for the 
passenger-wife to intervene in the operation of the motor 
vehjcle by way of suggestion or otherwise. Let it be un-
derstood that if the husband was negligent in activating 
the left turn signal as he entered the intersection while 
he was traveling 35 miles per hour and maintaining his 
position in the southbound lane of traffic, there was 
nothing to direct the plaintiff's attention to that fact or 
to the possibility that such conduct might be misleading 
to the defendant who had entered his left turn lane 
and would normally be expected to remain in it until 
plaintiff had cleared the intersection. The intersection 
was 129 feet wide (Exhibit P-9) and would be completely 
crossed by the Wardell car in a bout two and one-half sec-
onds. Obviously there was neither time nor opportunity 
for her to exercise any control over the vehicle within 
the trst of the Restatement quoted above. We quote 
further from Section 495 of the Restatement: 
'' ( e) ... consequently any circumstances which 
gives the plaintiff reason to believe that his ad-
vice, directions or warnings would be heeded is 
important in determining whether he is barred 
from recovery by his failure to attempt to give 
them. The fad that the driver of a vehicle is a 
minor child of the plaintiff, may, therefore, be 
important as it may give the parent reason to 
lwli(~Vc that the child will heed his directions. So 
too, t11e fact that the plaintiff owns the vehicle or 
the cliatt0l which to his knowledge is being care-
lessl.'' usrd, is also of importance, since one who is 
d ri \ ing anu1l1er 's vehicle or using his chattel is 
25 
more likely to pay attention to the owner's direc· 
tions than he would be to the directions of a gue8 
in his own car. 
"(f) In determining whether the plaintiff is neg 
ligent in failing to exercise an opportunity to co11 
trol the actions of the third person, allowanc, 
must be made for the possibility that by inter 
f ering the plaintiff will increase, rather than di 
minish, the danger. For a passenger or guest !1 
interfere with the driver by giving him direction 
or advice is often more likely to confuse than tr 
help him, and thus to increase rather than di 
minish the danger to both driver and passenger.' 
The foregoing principles enunciated by the Restalt 
ment were followed in the case of Sherman v. Kor ff, 35: 
Mich. 387, 91 N.\.V. 2d 485, from which we quote: 
"Parties having an equal right to a motor 1r 
hicle cannot be permitted to contend for the whee 
in moving traffic, and hence the imputation o 
negligence to the joint owner present upon th 
theory of equal legal right to domination or ro11 
trol is untenable ... citing cases. 
''Putting from our minds for the moment the sr 
duetions of easy fictions, what is the realistic lega 
situation of the parties here before us~ Amon 
several thoughtful analyses that have come ! 
our attention that of the Minnesota court in Chri• 
tensen v. Hennipen Transportation Co., Inc., 21 
Minn. 394, 10 N.\V. 2d 406, 412 147 A.L.R. 94: ~ 
seems most closely in point. The Court hel 1 
in part: 
" 'In the instance case plaintiff and her husban 
apparently wc>re co-owners of the automobile i 
question. They were regnrded as such throughou 
the case. The husabnc1 apparently was in po' 
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session of the car and exercising dominion over 
it, for he invited the wife to ride with him the 
same as one in possession might invite a person 
bearing him no relationship. At least, the infer-
ence was possible that he was in possession and 
had control at the time. 
'' 'Ownership of an automobile in which the owner 
is riding, but which is being driven by another, 
does not establish as a matter of law right of con-
trol in the owner. Right of control may be sur-
rendered, as it often is, where the owner parts 
with the possession of his car to another. In that 
situation the parties stand in the relationship of 
bailor and bailee. The negligence of a bailee in 
operating an automobile is not imputable to the 
bailor .... The existence of the marriage relation-
ship between the parties does not change their 
relaHon or liability with respect to bailed 
property .... ' 
''The Court there held thait the negligence could 
not be imputed on the ground that the assuming 
of the control of the operation by the husband 
under the circumstances constituted a bailment. 
The unqualified yielding of the possession and 
control of the automobile to the husband in the 
('ase at bar without instruction or discussion 
would just as logically constitute a bailment as 
the case just cited." 
In the case of Jenks v. Veeder Contracting Co., 30 
~· ).JYS 2cl 278, affirmed in 50 N.E. 2d 231, the Court said: 
'' rrhc decision is distinguishable from the facts 
here. Since the property here was jointly owned, 
1 lw lmslinncl having undertaken to use it, had dom-
irn1tio11 of it aml a legal right to control its opera-
1 ion. '!'lie joint owner could not, of all tim~s, 
:1"c:m111• <·u111 rol of the '•ehiele in the course of its 
operation. When one joint owner is at the dri1 
ing wheel and the vehicle is in motion on a high31 
1 
it is enough to say that the other joint owner i.' 
not then in control of its operation and is not ther 
in a position to assert control and assertion 0 
control or direction as to operation could proper} 
be resisted by the joint owner. Whatever migh 
ultimately be done in a law court in the event o ( 
a disagreement as to the use of the vehicle resuli l 
ing in a sale or disposal of the property, the higl , 
way would be the wrong place to make the asse1 t 
tion of a partial right of control. In the natur 
of things, a vehicle is controlled only by one per c 
son at one time and rights flowing from joir 
ownership must be divisible in point of time. Cer 
tainly assertion of such rights in the course r1 
such operation is not to my knowledge in H 
inter0~t of public safety: 'Parties having an eqn: 
legal title to a mofor vehicle cannot be permitte 
to contend for the wheel in moving traffic an 
hence the imputation of negligence to the joi1 
owner present upon the theory of equal leg: 
right to domination or control is untenable whi H 
applied to the facts of this case. h 
There was no evidence in the record upon which tl t 
jury could base a finding that the plaintiff's husbai1 d 
was her agent in the driving of the jointly owned r11 
The family purpose doctrine is not followed in this ju a 
isdiction, and the excursion to Western Union to mi (l 
a birthday gift to the plaintiff's son was a family pu 
pose and could not correctly be called the business ' 
the plaintiff only, any more than the husband would I ti 
the wife's agent in driving her to the supermarket · 
shop for the family groceries or to the post office 
c pick up a letter. Moreover, the purpose of the visit· 
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'11 town had been completed, and the plaintiff and her hus-
a: 
• i! band wern 011 their way back home with the husband at 
~e1 the wheel by thr exercise of his own choice, and the plain-
O' tiff made no attempt to interfere with the driving or 
:d make any suggestions as to the route, etc. She was ac-
gb 
, crrstomed to having the husband drive, as "he always 
c 0 
ull tlid the driving.'' rrhe Court, therefore, erred in its 
[gl various instructions which allowed the jury to find that 
sei the husband was the agent of the wife under the cir-
~ cumstances of this case at the time of the collision. 
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POINT 4 
THE COURT ERRED TO THE PRE.JUDICE 
OF THE PLAINTIFF IN FAILING TO GIVE 
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
egi In her Requested Instruction No. 4, the plaintiff 
1hi ask0d the Court to instruct the jury that the defendants 
had failed to prove that the plaintiff was guilty of con-
1 tl trihutory negligence, and that they should, therefore, 
ball disregard this issue. 
ca 
. In its Requested Instruction No. 5 the Court was 
JU asked to instruct the jury that the negligence of the 
ma driw'r could not be imputed to the plaintiff. 
p11 
3S ' rrhe Court erred in refusing to give these instruc-
ld I tions for the reasons heretofore discussed in this brief. 
et · 
ce In Requested Instruction No. 8 the plaintiff asked the 
3it · Cn1irt to instruct the jury that before making a left turn 
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from the through lane into the left turn lane, whit 
would have enabled the driver of the automobile in whit 
plaintiff was riding to proceed easterly on 33rd South, ti 
law imposed upon such driver the duty of giving a sign: 
at least 100 feet before changing lanes, and that perf orn 
ance of this duty could not constitute negligence on h 
part. The Court erred in refusing to give this instrui 
tion as requested for the reasons heretofore stated. 
In Requested Instruction No. 9 the plaintiff ash 
the Court to instruct the jury to the effect that the driY1 < 
of plaintiff's car could not have properly made a le 1 
turn at the intersection of 3190 South and 7th East wif 
out being in the designated left turn lane, and the d 
' fondant, in the exercise of ordinary care, would not ha1 
been justified under the facts in this case in assumii 
that the car in which plaintiff was riding would ma, 
such a turn, contrary to law. The Court refused tll 1' 
instruction, and the theory involved in it was not othf 
wise presented to the jury. Plaintiff submits that si 
] 
was entitled to have this instruction given in view oft 
t 
provisions of Section 41-6-66 Utah Code Annotated 19: 
The Court was requested to instruct the jury 
plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 10 to the effect tl1 
the mere fact that the automobile was registered in pla1 
tiff's name does not conclusively establish the ow111 
ship of the automobile or her right to control its oprr 
tion while it was being driven by her husband, and I 
fact that the driver of the v0hicle and the plaintiff w1 
husband and wife would not he sufficient in itself 1 
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lit l c<mstitute one tie agent of the other, and that if the jury 
llt should find that the plaintiff did not have the right to 
ti control the operation of the vehicle at the time of the col-
:ni fo;ion or immediately prior thereto, then the negligence, 
rn if any, of the driver could not be imputed to her. Failure 
h: to giYe this instruction was error in view of the discus-
llli :-;ieon heretofore set forth in this brief. 
Again the rrrial Court erred in failing to grant plain-
:kt tiff':-; Requested Instruction No. 11 to the effect that the 
tYr defendant had a continuing duty to maintain a proper 
le reasonahle lookout in the event he negotiated a left turn 
'if iHto tl1P path of plaintiff's vehicle, and that the left turn 
signal exhibited hy the car in which plaintiff was riding, 
di 
while surh car remained in the through lane, was not in it-
l8i 
self sufficie>nt excuse for the defendant driver to wi·thdraw 
Ill 
his attention from it and negotiate his turn without re-
13; 
t1 g-ard thereto. This request was especially applicable 
fr1 ''iew of the defendant's testimony that he saw the 
hf 
W n rdeil n·hicle only once a11d that at that time it was 
sl 
p1·(,<'t>edi11g in a straight course in the through lane of 
9i 
I' 
tit 
la1 
111 
JPI 
l t 
\\'I 
~ f 
trnffir approximately four or five car lengths away. 
h 
POINT 5 
Tlfl1~ COUHrr FJRRED IN GIVING VOLUMI-
X< )US AND UN:t'\ECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS 
rrHAT 'WOULD HAVE A TENDENCY TO 
eO:JF1TSF, THF, .JURY ANlJ RENDF-R MORE 
IHFFH !lTJ/r THEIR CONSIDERATION OF 
,\ PPHOPRL\ TE IRSTRUCTTONS. 
I 11 i 11 is <'<\:.;t• tl10 dcfonclants snhmitted 29 Requested 
, , •, 1i111 J.',, <t 1 itl 111 <' Con rt g-a \'e 21 of them. The Court's 
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instructions were 37 in number and their very Ieng: . 
t1 
must have been bewildering to the jury. The Oou; ti 
made frequent allusions to the principle of agency, ev1 
though the record was silent of any facts upon which 
finding of agency could have been reasonably based. a 
p 
Inapplicable instructions eontaiining refeirence I f 
contributory negligence were made in Instructions Nun tl 
bers 14, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 26. The instructions on th 
unproved issue of contributory negligence were heavi: 
weighted in favor of the defendants and against tl 3 
plaintiff. n 
t 
Plaintiff conceives of no possible reason for ti o 
Court's Instruction No. 20, which allowed the jury I v 
take the right of way away from the plaintiff if "caus1 a 
beyond the control of the driver'' excuse and justify tl f 
failure to yield. It is impossible to discover in the recor 
a scintilla of evidence which caused the defendant to plai 
his vehicle in the path of the Wardell car because 1 
causes beyond his control. He acted completely in ti 
1 
exercise of his own foolish choice. 
1 
Plaintiff made timely exception to the voluminor 1 
nature of the instructions for the reason that it woul l 
have a tendency to confuse the jury and render more di ' 
:fl.cult their perusal and reflection upon appropriate i t 
structions. (R. 222) ' 
Plaintiff made timely exception to the various i 
structions of the Court which were in violation of ti <. 
principles heretofore discussed in the brief, and plai 1 
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g: tiff specifically assigned reasons explaining each excep-
iu; tiou. (R. 218 to 223 inclusive) 
Vi 
h The Trial Court did not see fit to modify or correct 
any of the instructions which had been submitted, and 
plaintiff respectfully submits that she was prevented 
I from having a fair trial of the issues applicable under 
un the pleadings and evidence in this case. 
th 
vi: The Court in the ease of Taylor v. Johnson, 15 U. 2d 
tl 342, 393 P. 2d 382, has condemned the giving of volumi-
nous, repetitious, misleading and inapplicable instruc-
tions, especially where some of the instructions are based 
ti on factual situations not supported by the evidence, and 
'1 where the instructions are weighted in favor of one party 
181 and against the other, thus preventing the offended party 
tl from enjoying the blessings of a fair trial. 
~! 
CONCLUSION 
J 1 
1 
The~ great fundamental concept underlying our neg-
t ligence law is that when a person suffers an injury or 
loss caused by the fault of another, the burden of that 
101 los~, so far as it can be reasonably compensated, should 
)111 be shifted from the innocent to the shoulders of the 
di wrongdoer. In the two seconds which elapsed between 
~ 1 the ad nating of the signal by Wardell and the collision 
which oecuned at the intersection of Springview Drive 
atH1 7th J1~ast, what reasonable opportunity presented it-
, r self to tl1e plaintiff which she, in the exercise of ordinary 
ti eare ~rnd prnclenc0, fail0d to grasp? ·wherein was she at 
lai fault! 8l1011ld ,.;]1e, nsscrting lH'r rights of co-ownership, 
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have wrestled for control of the car as it passed throu 
the intersection at the lawful rate of 35 miles per hour 
the through lane? As a wife accustomed to yielding 
driver's seat to the head of the family, whom she 
learned to consider a very good driver from his p 
performance, was it her duty to assault his eiars with 
continual chorus of suggestion and direction? Reas 
truth, justice and common sense, as a quartet in perf 
harmony with the facts in this case, place the respo 
bility for this accident and the resultant loss to the plai 
tiff upon the foolish, unthinking, decision of the defen 
ant to place his vehicle in front of the oncoming Ward 
car without proper regard to the safety of the perso 
involved. 
In the development of law, there is no need for p 
sumption, inference or legal fiction, when the truth shi 
brightly before us, and decisions recognizing these p · 
ciples will endure and survive all subsequent inquiry 
provide an illuminating guide to the solution of fut 
problems. 
Plaintiff earnestly and respectfully urges this Con 
in the furtherance of justice, to reverse the judgment e 
tered by the Trial Court and grant plaintiff a new tri 
with directions limiting the retrial of the case to the iss 
of damages only. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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